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Graham Dodd #0896
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 521-3680
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENE GRAY, an individual,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No.

20046

vs.
DAVID FOSTER, an individual,
Defendant,
and ADRIAN GARRITSEN, an
individual,
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of contract and fraud
brought by Plaintiff/Respondent Gene Gray against. Defendant David
Foster and Defendant/Appellant Adrian Garritsen.
Counterclaimed against Plaintiff.

Both Defendants

Since no appeal was brought by

Defendant Foster, or by the Plaintiff against Foster; the
judgment in favor of Foster and against Plaintiff is
unchallenged.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon hearing the evidence and accepting the exhibits
herein, the Honorable Philip Fishier, entered the following
findings:
1.

That Plaintiff was liable for fraud upon Defendant

Foster, the latter to have Judgment over and against Plaintiff
for $5,000 on Defendant Foster's Counterclaim.
2.

No cause of action on the Plaintiff's Complaint

against the Defendant Foster.
3.

That Plaintiff was given Judgment against Defendant

Garritsen for $20,000 on his Complaint.

This was later amended

by Minute Entry to $25,000 dated April 13, 1984 and included in
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R=Record)
(see R-123).
4.

Defendant Garritsen was awarded the Gold Ridge

Claims 1 through 10, located in Section 14; Township 2 North;
Range 1 East, in Davis County.
5.

No cause of action on Defendant Garritsen's

Counterclaim.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
1.

Respondents requests that the judgment of the trial

Court against Appellant be affirmed.
2.

That damages for delay under Rule 73(1) Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure be assessed.

-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts Appellants1 Statement of Facts
except as to those facts which have been omitted and those which
are controverted as enumerated below.

Respondent believes that

the facts below more completely conform to the transcript of the
record.

It should be noted that there is no matter on appeal

between Respondent and Defendant F* ter; therefor their factual
relationship is only included where relevant to the Appellant and
Respondent herein.
In 1980, the Plaintiff Gene Gray (Gray) met the
Defendant David Foster (Foster) and loaned him $10,000 to start a
Utah Corporation called Traders Exchange (Transcript~?r) (Tr
140).

In exchange for the loan, Gray was to obtain one-half of

the stock to be owned by Foster in the future company plus his
$10,000 back. (Tr 141; 193;194)

The stock was lat* * defined to

be 400,000 shares of stock (Tr 142) Nothing in writing was made
of this Agreement (Tr 172).
After the passage of some time, the Corporation was
formed and Gray made demand for his stock and money but received
nothing (Tr 142).
The Defendant Adrian Garritsen (Garritsen) who was
officing with Gray (Tr 144) then told Gray not to be involved
with Foster but to deal through him.

He would be the middleman

and work it out (Tr 143). Gray & Foster entered into a limited
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agency agreement (Exhibit 2-D) (Tr 212) whereby Garritsen was to
obtain a Duplex from Foster for Gray.

Garritsen then believed he

could take funds from the Duplex transaction to obtain mining
property in Bountiful, Utah for Gray (Tr 214). Garritsen
promised an old Granddaddy claim owned by one Bulkley that had
been in operation since 1958 (Tr 144). He also gave an ore
sample to Gray (Tr 145; Exhibit P-1); Gray received Assay Reports
on the ore made in 1978 (Tr 151 & 154; Exhibit P-ll).

Garritsen

said the mine was valuable and that there was a buyer for it who
would put a $10,000 down payment on it (Tr 145; 158 Exhibit P-9)
and that there was ore being shipped from the mine (Tr 158).
Garritsen claims this was not the only mine he knew of (Tr
224).

But Gray claims this was the only mine he would accept,

and the only one he knew of (TR 146).
Based upon this relationship with Garritsen, Gray
signed exhibits 2-D; 3-D; 4-D; & 5-D (TR 144) drawn-up by
Garritsen (Tr 194), which purport to be settlement and release
documents; but Gray never got anything of value directly from
either Foster or Garritsen (Tr 195).
However, in February 1982, Garritsen had Foster
transfer his duplex in Santaquin to Wall Investment (Tr 204)
through a friend of his whom he had known for 10 years

by the

name of Goodsil (Tr 205). From this transaction Garritsen
personally received $5,500 in cash and the forgiveness of
principal and interest on notes in an amount of $16,000
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(Tr 206). The total sales price on the Duplex was $49,378.83.
Owing on the Duplex was approximately $24,000.00; therefore, the
equity in the Duplex was approximately $25,000.00 (Tr 206-207;
Exhibit 19-D). All of the proceeds from this transaction went to
Garritsen (Tr 215), and Garritsen did not tell Gray about this
(Tr 228).

According to the Agency Agreement (Exhibit 2-D) this

$25,000.00 should have gone to Gray.

Instead, Garritsen tried to

find mining claims for Gray.
Gray became suspicious about the mine transaction when
he went to see Bulkley, the supposed owner, with the 10 Gold
Ridge nining claims that Garritsen had tendered to him in
November of 1982 (Tr 159; 163; Exhibit 14-P) and Bulkley
disclaimed any knowledge of the sale (Tr 161; Exhibit 8-P). Gray
then went to the Recorder's office in Farmington and obtained the
information on exhibit 17-P (Tr 167) and then to \he Bureau of
Land Management (Tr 165) and obtained the information on exhibit
16-P; and then to the State office to obtain the information on
Exhibit 15-P (Tr 164-165). The actual exhibits were obtained at a
later date (TR 164-167).

All of these exhibits indicate no

property by the name of Gold Ridge, existed prior to September of
1982 (Tr 166). At the time that Garritsen had tendered the 10
Gold Ridge mining claims in November of 1982, Gray had believed
them to be the same claims that he had discussed earlier (Tr 195)
with the existing mine in operation, shipping ore, upon which he
had the Assay report and which had a potential buyer; otherwise
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he would not have signed exhibit 3-D, the release (Tr 195). Gray
concluded that on or about November 26, 1982, the Gold Ridge
claims tendered to him by Garritsen were not the claims they had
been discussing (Tr 284 & 292).

(Under questioning from the

Court, Garritsen admitted that "it was a brand new claim
location". (Tr 142-143))

Therefore, Gray rejected the tender of

the 10 Gold Ridge claims (Tr 122). The evidence shows that
according to Garritsen there were in fact 2 mining claims in Ward
Canyon, above Bountiful (Tr 224, 226-227), and that Garritsen had
authority to sell the claim owned by Bulkley (Tr 225) and
supplied Gray with pertinent data on that claim (Tr 226). Also,
that Bulkley was doing business as Prospect Mines; but exhibit
15-9 by the Secretary of State indicates to the contrary (Tr 228229).

In addition, Gray discovered that there had been no

assessment work done on the Gold Ridge Claims and no prior claims
appeared on the records of the BLM (Tr 230).
With respect to Garritsen's Counterclaim, he claims to
have sold $25,000 of product to Bare Body Products (Tr 248) and
helped collect $9#50G on an account in Puerto Rico and one in
Portland, Oregon and estimates that the total collections
effected by him total $50,000 (Tr 250-251).

All of the foregoing

is based upon a verbal agreement that he was to get 10 percent of
the amounts he collected (Tr 241) and 50 percent, after expenses,
of amounts of products that he sold (Tr 241). But he had no
documentary proof of any of these claims and was just assuming

that he had money coming (Tr 258). He did not see the check for
the Bare Body account (Tr 256) and can't remember the amounts of
the accounts collected (Tr 257). Gray testified that there was
never an employment agreement with Garritsen (Tr 285).

Just

"...ten percent of anything he could collect or 25 percent of
anything he could sell". (Tr 285)

There was only less than

$1,000 collected and never in ex^ ss of $100.00 sold (Tr 285).
Bare Body never paid (Tr 285) and Garritsen was paid $250.00 for
his services (Tr 285) and Garritsen admits this (Tr 248).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FIND AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, OR
RELEASE BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT
OR A WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL

A careful review of the record reveals that Garritsen
in his answer, (R 12-16*

.;er complied with Rule 8(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procecure, in that he never pleaded as an
affirmative defense, neither Accord and Satisfaction nor
estoppel, nor payment, nor release, nor any other matter.

Rule 8

(c) states in its pertinent parts as follows:
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute
of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any
other matter constituting an avoidable or
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly
-7-

designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if
justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as
if there had been a proper designation. (Emphasis
Added)
These issues were raised for the first time in
Garritsen's Brief.

This Court has held that these kinds of

Affirmative Defenses are required to be included in the Answer.
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative
defense which ordinarily must be pleaded in the
answer in order to be raised. Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 8(c). Hintze v. Seaich, 437 P.2d
202, 20 Utah 2d 275, 275 (1968)
Defenses of accord and satisfaction, account
stated, and laches are affirmative defenses which
are required to be stated in answer. Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 8(c)." F.M.A. Financial
Corp. v. Build, Inc. , 404 P.2d 670, 17 Utah 2d 80
(1965)
By not raising them in his Answer in a timely manner as
required by Rule 8(c), and pursuant to the language of this Court
in the above cited cases, Garritsen has waived his right to now
raise these Affirmative Defenses and they should be stricken from

In addition to the foregoing and should the Court
desire further argument, there was ample testimony to the effect
that the so called "Release" document (Exhibit 3-D) was signed
based upon the belief by Gray, that he had received the 10 mining
claims that he had discussed in February with Garritsen and upon
which he had obtained the ore (Exhibit 1-P); assay reports
(exhibit 11-P); with a potential buyer (Exhibit 9-P); from which
ore was being shipped (Tr 158). Gray stated (Tr 195) that the
-8-

only reason that he signed Exhibit 3-D among other things was the
belief that the ten mining claims offered to him by Garritsen on
Exhibit P-14 were the same ten that he had discussed earlier.

"I

trusted Garritsen's word" (Tr 195) stated Gray; but Garritsen did
not tell Gray about the money he had made from the sale of the
Duplex (Tr 228), nor did he explain to Gray that there were in
fact 2 mines in the same area.

Gray stated he believed "There

was only one mine on that section of ground" (Tr 146). Clearly
what happened, was that Garritsen, since he had the receipts from
the Duplex sale in his pocket, and since Bulkley refused to sell
the mine that he had discussed with Gray, went out and staked
some adjacent claims and tendered them to Gray, (Tr 279-280)
without telling him.
This writer has not been able to find any cases
directly on point concerning releases, but will follow the
admonition of this Court in Horgan, infra.
a release is a type of contract and may gene
^y
be enforced or rescinded on the same grounds as
other contracts. Horgan v. Industrial Design,
Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (1982)
Obviously, there was a mistake made by Gray when he
signed Exhibit 3-D since he signed it upon the belief that he was
getting the "Granddaddy" claims (Tr 146). This Court has held
that under such circumstances these agreements are not
enforceable:
Agreement obtained by misrepresentation, fraud, or
mistake is generally voidable. Tanner v. District
Judges of Third Judicial District Court In and For
Salt Laic- County, 649 P.2d 5. (1982)
-9-

Transactions between persons occupying fiduciary
and confidential relations with each otherf in
which the stronger or supervisor party obtains an
advantage over the other, cannot be upheld.
Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298, 121 Utah 362
(1966)
Accordingly, the so called release cannot be
enforced.

In addition, because Garritsen did not deliver the

property that he had promised (Tr 144) there was a failure of
consideration which the Court has ably defined as follows:
There is distinction between 'lack of
consideration' and 'failure of consideration1,
where consideration is lacking, there can be no
contract? where consideration fails, there was
contract when agreement was made, but because of
some supervening cause, promised performance
fails. General Insurance Co. of America v.
Carnicero Dynasty Corp. 545 P.2d 502 (1976)
When this happens, the Court has held that that part or
failure of performance prevents the use of Accord and
Satisfaction as a defense.
Part performance of an accord by the debtor,
accompanied by unjustified failure to perform the
remainder, is not operative as a satisfaction and
does not bar an action in the original claim.
Stratton v. West States Construction 440 P.2d 117,
21 Utah 2d 60 (1968). "in action by homeowners
against Corporation for alleged Breach of Contract
and fraud in relation to remodeling work done on
home, plead of Accord and Satisfaction did not
constitute a defense to Corporation since the
Corporation failed to complete its performance
according to agreement of the parties, (ibid)
The current case before the bar is akin to the same
dilemma that the Plaintiff found herself in, in the Hatch case,
infra, wherein the Defendant tried to unilaterally change the

_i n _

performance. In that case, the Court had no problem in m^

ig

short shrift of the Defendant's claim of Accord and Satisfaction.
Where defendant, after paying for gilsonite ore
based on deli ,*ry weights for a time, unilaterally
began to deduct 15% from all payments thereafter
made calculated on deliverv weights as claimed L/
plaintiff and plaintiff ace ^ted the checks as
paid to him but there never was any agreement that
he would be satisfied with such arrangement and
he was constantly told by defendant's officials
that they would pay him for all of the ore which
he deliverd, there was not an account stated an
there was no accord and satisfaction of the matter
that would support interpreting contract as
agreeing that claimed weight minus 15% was the
correct tonnage. Hatch v. Zieglar Cheiu+cdl and
Mineral Corporation, 506 P.2d 71, 29 Utah 2d 151
(1973)
In addition, the record is clear that Gray, once he
found out about the changed claims, repudiated the offer by
stating, "...I found out Friday that there was a switch.

Monday,

I went ...I called Garritsen, and I told him, 'I am not go^ng to
accept something that I didn't buy." (Tr 161). Under these
conditions the Court has held that this effectively negates the
Accord.
Where there is dispute about claim and o^e party
makes an offer of settlement which is ccepted and
performed by other, that constitutes "accord &nd
satisfaction" of claim but accord may be negated
by any dispute by offeree of settlement. Ben lett
v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 417 P.2d 761, 18
Utah 2d 141 (1966)
Perhaps Gray's reliance upon Garritsen was childlike,
and in view of after events, ill advised but there is precident
for it in the history of this Court as outlined in the following
1962 case.
-11-

Ordinarily party has right to rely upon fact that
formal document prepared by other will express
their original and definite agreement, and he may
expect and rely upon literal conformity if no
notice to the contrary is given. Mawhinney v.
Jensen, 232 P.2d 769, 120 Utah 142 (1962)
And ultimately, in a most recent case the Court has
explained why Garritsen's First claim for error must fail; since
Gray's proceeding against Garritsen was based upon their original
agreement that acting as Gray's agent, Garritsen would satisfy
his claim against Foster.

See Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d

196 (1983)
"An executory accord, on the other hand, "is an
agreement that an existing claim shall be
discharged in the future by the rendition of a
substituted performance." 6 Corbin Contracts
§1269 at 75 (1962). The agreement does not
discharge the existing claim; it is discharged by
the substituted performance. If there is a
failure to perform the executory accord, the
creditor may elect to proceed either upon his
original claim or the accord. L & A Drywall, Inc.
v. Whitmore Construction Co., Utah, 608 P.2d 626,
629 (1980)
Based upon the evidence before the trial Court, there
was no proper Affirmative Defense pleaded in Garritsen's
Answer.

There was no fulfillment of performance that would

warrant the trial Court finding that there had been an Accord and
Satisfaction; release or waiver and estoppel.

Indeed, as this

Court concluded in the Hintze case infra and as the trial Court
concluded in the case at Bar, ..." there was no meeting of the
minds..." (Tr 297), which is an absolute prerequisite to the
formation of a contract.

-12-

"In suit by former employees of defendant to
recover wages and commissions allegedly due them,
burden was upon the former employees to prove by
preponderance of evidence the amount to which
they were entitled. Since voucher which was
attached to check and which stated "This is the
balance of your account in full" did not state
that the check was to be returned if it was not so
accepted, it was clear that there was no meeting
of minds thai acceptance of the check by former
salesman was to be in complete settlement of
dispute with former employer as to commissions
owed, and accordingly, former salesman's cashing
of the check did not constitute an accord and
satisfaction." Hintze v. Seaich, 437 P.2d 202, 20
Utah 2d 275 (1968) (Emphasis Added).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT AWARD EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES TO APPELLANT AND WAS CORRECT IN
FINDING FOR RESPONDENT ON APPELLANT'S
COUNTERCLAIM.

On the question of damages this Court has laid down the
ground rules in a 1968 case as follows:
Desired objective in computing damages, is to
evaluate any loss suffered by the most direr*-,
practical and accurate method that can be
employed. Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 44b ..2d
709, 22 Utah 2d 49 (1968)
In the case at Bar, the evidence is clear that
Garritsen, undertook to become Gray's agent and handle the
transaction involving Foster (Tr 143; 195) and even drew all of
the papers up.

Therefore, the evidence on the sale of the Duplex

is unequivical and clearly indicates that the equity in the same
was at least $25,000.00 (Tr 207; Exhibit 19-D).
belonged to Gray and should have be

This equity

made available to Gray in

Februaiy of 1982, shortly after the closing.

Therefore, the

Courts' finding of a $25,000.00 judgment is based upon reason,

-13-

and the best available evidence before the Court.

It is also the

law of this State, as contained in the following cases:
"Generally, damages awarded for personal property
which is taken or destroyed are based on item's
market value at time of taking or destruction."
Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453
"Non breaching party should receive award which
will put him in as good position as he would have
been in had there been no breach of contract.
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 455 P. 2d 197, 23
Utah 2d. Also followed in Utah Farm Production
Credit Association v. Cox 627 P.2d 62.
General rule in contract law is that damages
recoverable for breach are those which arise
naturally from the breach and which reasonably may
be supposed to have been within contemplation of
parties or are reasonably foreseeable and they are
essentially compensatory in nature." Robbins v.
Finlay, 645 P.2d 623.
In addition, should there be any question as to the
correctness of the award, the trial Court has been granted some
leeway by this Court in assessing damages as outlined in the two
decisions that follow:
"Minute findings by trial court are not required
and it need not detail every item which goes into
a finding of damages in breach of contract
cases." Holman v. Sorensen, 556 P.2d 499.
"Where there is evidence of fact of damage,
defendant may not escape liability on ground that
amount of damage cannot be proved with
precision." Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, (1983)
In accord is Cook Associates, Inc., v. Warnick,
664 P.2d 1161 (1983); Turtle Management, Inc. v.
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P. 2d 667.
Garritsen emphasizes his testimony that he spent
$20,000.00 plus labor which he valued at $1,500.00 (Tr 239, 240)
and that the Gold Ridge claims were made at Grayfs request (Tr
-14-

227).

But under cross-examination, Garritsen admitted that Gray

gave him no money to go out and get the Gold Ridge claims; and in
factf the very name "Gold Ridge" was created by him and Bulkley
(Tr 253). There was no documentary evidence as to the alleged
$20,000.00 expenditure (Tr 255). Garritsen also claimed that he
had no duty to do assessment work or perfect the claims (Tr 230);
yet Gray had made it clear to him that he would not, and did not
accept the substituted "Gold Ridge" mining claims, for the
"Granddaddy" claims he had earlier bargained for (Tr 259, 260).
Under the case law above cited, once Gray had refused the tender
of the changed performance, there could be no settlement and the
mining claims were Garritsen's responsibility.
With respect to Garritsen1s counterclaim, the trial
Court held that the evidence was evenly balanced and therefore,
Garritsen failed to carry his burden of proof therein (R 122).
In looking at the evidence one must keep in mind this Court's
admonition that "Damages cannot be found from mere speculation
and conjectured evidence/1
Utah 2d 83 (1962).

Bennell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 13

About the only point that there is harmony

on, in the evidence, is the fact that there was an oral
agreement, between Garritsen and Gray, whereby Garritsen would
get 10 percent of any money he collected, and a percentage of any
income from sales that he generated, less expenses (Tr 241;
285).

Gray claims that since the agreement, "And I don't think

there was $1,000.00 collected, and there's never over a hundred
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dollars sold" (Tr 285). Further, that the Bare Body account
never paid, but from his suing them to recover money he paid
Garritsen $250.00 (Tr 285). Therefore, even if we allow that
there was $100.00 in sales, and $1,000.00 collected, and even if
we view the agreement in the best light for Garritsen, he was not
entitled to more than 10 percent of $1,000.00 plus 50 percent of
$100.00, which totals $150.00.

Both of them agree he was paid in

excess of this amount (Tr 285; 248). Therefore, how has he been
damaged?

Garritsen claims he sold some of the products to Bare

Body Products Company (Tr 247) and that they would expend
$25,000.00 on Gray's products (Tr 248). He also claims to have
helped to collected $50,000.00 in receivables (Tr 249); but
Garritsen admitted that these figures and names were hazy in his
memory because, "I don't have access to the records" (Tr 251).
But he did in fact have access to the records.

The complaint in

this matter was filed on June 29, 1983 (R2), and served upon
Garritsen on June 25, 1983 (R8). The cutoff date on discovery
was not until November 15, 1983 (R43), therefore, had Garritsen
been earnest in his counterclaim, he had a full five months in
which to seek the records, through discovery.

The record shows,

he failed to do this. He cannot now be found to complain that he
did not have the records to substantiate his claims.

In fact,

under cross examination, Garritsen could not remember any
amounts, or any checks that Gray received as a result of his
efforts (Tr 256) and he simply admitted, "I do not know" twice
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(Tr 257) when questioned for more specifics.

Further, he

admitted that he was just making assumptions,and did not have any
actual facts (Tr 258).
Respondent claims that based upon the foregoing, the
trial Court was generous to even hold that the evidence was even
on Garritsen's Counterclaim; arid was fully justified in holding
that Garritsen had failed to carry his burden oi proof on his
counterclaim, therefor, no cause of action.
III.

THIS APPEAL WAS MADE SOLELY FOR DELAY:
THEREFORE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN
INCREASE IN HIS COSTS IN AN AMOUNT NOT TO
EXCEED 25 PERCENT OF THE JUDGMENT
APPEALED FROM.

Rule 73(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads
as follows:
(1) Dismissal Of Appeal: Penalty For Delay.
Failure of the appellant to take any of the
further steps to secur the review of the case,
except filing notice of appeal and depositing the
fees therefor, shall not affect the validity of
the appeal but is ground for such actions as the
district court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal. On the trial of
the cause on appeal, if it appears to the court
that the appeal was made solely for delay, it may
add to the costs such damages as may be just, not
exceeding twenty-five perc^rit of the judgmentappealed from. (Emphasis auded)
From the history of this case, there are several
incidents pertaining to the Defendant Garritsen which if taken
singly, may not carry sufficient weight to allow this court to
grant Gray delay damages under Rule 73(1); but if taken
collectively and viewed as a whole indicate a lack of sincerety
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and purpose in both his defense and counterclaims in the case at
Bar.
Firstly, Garritsen1s Answer has none of the Affirmative
Defenses in it which are required under Rule 8(c) of the Utah
Rules of Procedure (R 13-17 )•

Surely, a serious defendant would

have included these in his Answer, had he believed them available
at the time.

But these appear to be an afterthought on

Garritsenfs part, after having lost in the trial Court, and
groping for means to delay the imposition of the Court's
ruling.

In addition, the Answer and Counterclaim was filed late.

Another indication of Garritsen1s apparent indolent approach to
the case.
Secondly, there was no timely discovery attempted by
Garritsen on either his counterclaim or the complaint against him
(See Record on Appeal).

Yet at the time of trial, and in his

brief, Garritsen indicates that he never had access to the
records (Tr 256 - 258). Yet he never made any attempt to obtain
them.

The Record is void of any indication that Garritsen was

serious about this case until he filed his appeal.

Surely this

is an indication that he is filing the appeal as an afterthought,
or out of desparation, to cover his nonchalant approach up to the
trial.

Is this not a delaying tactic?
Thirdly, less than one month before pre-trial,

Garritsen changed attorney (R-42) and yet he still did not amend
his pleadings to add the Affirmative Defenses or seek discovery

on his counterclaim.

Again, are these the actions of a person

who is seriously intent on defending his case and proving his
counterclaim?
Fourthly, Garritsen has only filed a Cost Bond in this
matter

rather than a supersedeas Bond.

Apparently, in an

attempt to save the costs of the more inclusive supercedeas bond
(R128).

But is this the act of a serious Appellant, who is

genuine in his Appeal?
Respondent sub its that when the Court looks at all of
these acts of the Defendant-Appellant Garritsen, taken in their
entirety, that the Court has ample grounds to find that the
Appeal was made solely for delay or, at least, that the appeal
level is not the appropriate time to begin to fight the case
seriously.

Further, that if the Court so finds that $6,250.00 is

a just amount to be awarded Gray for his damages in having to
defend this Appeal.
Respectfully submitted on this 15th day of October,
1984.

"•"^-efaham Dodd *
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 521-3680
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